Special Series Part-III: Merchants of terror run amok

In Part II of this special series on the state of terrorism in Afghanistan, Professor (Dr) Nishakant Ojha, an eminent expert in counter Terrorism (West Asia and the Middle East), delved into how terrorist outfits, who have a safe haven in Afghanistan, have created a dilemma of sorts for the Taliban. In Part III, he explores other outfits that operate with the Taliban's blessings and those who pose a potent military opposition to the Taliban’s administration.

Special Series Part-I: The dilemma for Taliban in terror haven

Special Series Part-II: The terror trio under Taliban's patronage

Tehreek-e-Taliban Tajikistan (TTT): This is one of the new chapters of the Taliban with an objective to establish an Islamic Emirate of Tajikistan. It was founded by members of the Jamaat Ansarullah terrorist group of Tajikistan, and it has already infiltrated the mountainous autonomous Badakhshan region of Tajikistan. The leader of this faction is a Tajikistani national named Mohammad Sharipov (alias Mehdi Arsalon) who has been a close associate of the Taliban’s Chief of Army Staff, Qari Fasiuddin.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU): Formed by ethnic Uzbeks from Uzbekistan, it has a long history of activities in Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and the Tribal Areas of Pakistan. The intervention of NATO in Afghanistan pushed IMU fighters into the tribal Areas of Pakistan, and the killing of multiple leaders of the organization weakened its operational capabilities. Some members of IMU defected to Al Qaeda and some to IS-K. Yet, the IMU continues to exist as an organization with the potential to expand into Uzbekistan. Recently, the Taliban have moved the leadership and key commanders of IMU to the Pashtun Kot district of the northern Faryab province of Afghanistan. Within this group, they are hosting the extended family members of Tahir Yuldash, the former leader of the IMU.

East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM): This Islamist group consists of ethnic Uyghurs from the Xinjiang province of China. Their objective is to resist China’s rule in Xinjiang, thus adding a separatist objective to their Islamist identity. In the last 4 decades of conflict in Afghanistan, thousands of Uyghurs have migrated and settled in Afghanistan, especially in the north-eastern Badakhshan region. Besides ETIM, ethnic Uyghurs are also prominent members of Al Qaeda and IS-K. As an example, one of the leaders of ETIM in Afghanistan, Abdul Haq-al-Turkistani (Abu Hamza) is also a member of the Al Qaeda Rahbari Shura (Leadership Council). 

For now, ETIM does not have sufficient operational capabilities to conduct attacks inside China, so they are focused on attacking Chinese nationals and assets in the region, especially those associated with the One Belt One Road Initiative in Central Asia and CPEC in Pakistan. The recent wave of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan that have targeted Chinese nationals are at the very least influenced by those fighters of ETIM that are part of IS-K.

Caucasus Emirate: Many extremist fighters from the Caucasus region (Chechnya, Dagestan) have been fighting alongside the Taliban in the last 20 years. The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan has now created a hospitable environment for the mobilization of fighters from the Caucasus. These groups want to commence their efforts for a separatist war in the Caucasus region with the objective of establishing a Caucasus Emirate. There are numerous reports of an influx of fighters from the Caucasus to Afghanistan since early 2022. 

Many of these fighters are well acquainted with the country as some of these fighters had been enlisted in the 055 Brigade of Al Qaeda in the past 30 years, and they have now switched their identity back to the Caucasus Emirate. These veteran fighters are facilitating the arrival of new fighters from the Caucasus region into Afghanistan.

Iranian Insurgents: Jundullah was a Sunni extremist group that resisted the Shiite Islamic Republic of Iran. While this group is now defunct, it is succeeded by Jaish-e-Adl and Ansar-al-Furqan. Some members of these two succeeding groups are either based in southwest Afghanistan or frequently travel there due to their personal/ideological connections with figures inside the Taliban. However, at this point in time, the Taliban have not encouraged or facilitated them to conduct attacks inside Iran.

Sepah-e-Sahaba (Millat-e-Islamia): A Sunni-extremist party that targets Shiite communities in South Asia. While the party is active in the political process of Pakistan, its more extremist wings are enjoying a safe haven inside the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

Lashkar-e-Taiba: An anti-India terrorist group that aims to liberate Kashmir from Indian rule. It is also sometimes referred to as the Punjabi Taliban. The militant wings of this group are active in various parts of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

Jaish-e-Mohammad: This is another anti-Indian terrorist group that aims to liberate Kashmir from Indian rule and merge it into Pakistan. Members of this group participated in the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan and are actively enjoying sanctuaries in the eastern parts of the country.

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi: An anti-Shiite terrorist group that enjoys bases inside Afghanistan. Over the last 20 years, this group has conducted many suicide attacks against Shiite targets in Afghanistan. Some of their members are now part of the cell of IS-K in Afghanistan that specifically targets the Hazara Shiite minority in the western neighbourhoods of Kabul with devastating suicide attacks.

Anti-Taliban Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan

Islamic State of Khorasan (Daesh): This is the most potent military opposition to the Taliban’s administration. They have continued to break records in terms of the frequency and violence of their suicide attacks, with a special focus on Shiite neighbourhoods. They have also targeted senior Taliban religious scholars and their madrassas. While they have had limited success in acquiring additional geography from the Taliban, they have been able to expose the myth of “full and comprehensive” security that the Taliban claim as its main achievement in Afghanistan. 

The ranks of Daesh continue to swell with extremists from ethnic minorities (mostly associated with the Hizb-ut-Tahrir), Salafists, former Mujahideen and disenfranchised Taliban commanders. Many Taliban commanders who were able to accumulate wealth from taxes and smuggling in their regions are now forced to transfer any revenues to the central government, thus incentivizing them to break ranks with the Taliban and join IS-K which would enable them to keep revenues. 

The current leader of IS-K in Afghanistan is Shahab al-Muhajir (Sanaullah Ghafari) who was a key member of the Haqqani Network (faction of the Taliban) before defecting to IS-K and ultimately becoming its leader. He hails from the Shakardara district of Kabul Province and had previously been a member of the Haqqani Network. On the 9th of June 2023, reports emerged that Shahab Al Muhajir has been killed in the Kunar Province of Afghanistan, but the reports were not widely confirmed by reliable sources until that date.

According to the internal reports of the Interim Taliban Authority, below are the four sub-components that form the IS-K in Afghanistan:

A)  Ideological IS-K that is bent on killing Taliban and Shiites in Afghanistan, with its inspiration coming from ISIS in the Middle East and its recruits coming from the Hizb-u-Tahrir (Salafist Group) and transnational terrorist groups based in Afghanistan.

B)  Disenfranchised former Taliban members mostly in the eastern Nangarhar province and the Shomali Areas of northern Kabul province that have now formed their own wing of IS-K.

C)  Pro-Indian wing of IS-K which according to the Taliban’s allegations is closely related to India and funded by them. The ITA believes that this cell of IS-K was created during the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and is still sustained with Indian funds to support TTP in its war against Pakistan and target those segments of the Taliban that are pro-Pakistani. They believe that the recent attacks against the Pakistani Charge d’Affaires in Kabul, and the attack on Chinese diplomats and businessmen in Kabul were conducted by this cell in Kabul. The ITA’s General Directorate of Intelligence claims to have arrested two individuals associated with this cell after the attack on the Pakistani Charge d’Affaires in Kabul and these two detainees confessed that their cell had also planned to conduct attacks against the Chinese diplomats and businessmen in Afghanistan.

D) Pro-Pakistani cell of IS-K that was created as a hedge by Pakistan during the existence of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. This group largely consists of the Orakzai tribe from western Pakistan, but is based in Afghanistan and targets Indian interests in the country.

Jamaat Ansarullah’s Daesh Wing: The main Islamist group in Tajikistan with its bases located in northern Afghanistan. They assisted the Taliban in their takeover of Afghanistan, and they now expect the Taliban to assist them in overthrowing the secular regime in Tajikistan. Parts of this group have defected to IS-K and are now fighting against the ITA. Many recent suicide bombers of IS-K were Tajik nationals with a history of association with Jamaat Ansarullah of Tajikistan.

ETIM’ Daesh Wing: One part of ETIM that pledged allegiance to IS-K believes that the Taliban have betrayed the true ideals of Jihad and are now attempting to become administrators while establishing a close relationship with China. They believe that unless the Taliban assists groups like ETIM in waging a Jihad against China, it is appropriate to attack the ITA just as it was appropriate to attack the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

IMU’s Daesh Wing: Just like the ETIM’s Daesh wing, the IMU’s Daesh wing believes that they assisted the Taliban in their takeover of Afghanistan and now it is the Taliban’s turn to reciprocate and help IMU in its Jihad against Uzbekistan. But they feel betrayed by the Taliban and are now actively fighting against them under the banner of IS-K.

End of Part III. Watch this space for Part IV