On 14 March 1988, Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces engaged in a violent confrontation at Johnson South Reef, part of the Spratly Islands. Vietnamese troops, attempting to assert sovereignty, were fired upon by Chinese warships despite being unarmed.
The South China Sea has become a theatre of strategic confrontation, driven by China’s expansive territorial claims and coercive actions. The seizure of Johnson South Reef in 1988, where Vietnam lost 64 sailors, was not merely a clash over a disputed feature. It marked the beginning of China’s militarised approach to enforcing its maritime ambitions. This incident remains emblematic of Beijing’s pattern of using force to consolidate control over contested waters, undermining regional peace and international maritime law.
On 14 March 1988, Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces engaged in a violent confrontation at Johnson South Reef, part of the Spratly Islands. Vietnamese troops, attempting to assert sovereignty, were fired upon by Chinese warships despite being unarmed. China quickly constructed military structures on the reef, marking its first permanent outpost in the Spratlys. Since then, the reef has been transformed through land reclamation and fortification, forming part of a larger chain of militarised installations, including Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef. These artificial islands now host airstrips, missile platforms, radar systems, and logistics bases, extending China’s power projection capabilities across the South China Sea.
Beijing’s justification for its actions stems from its Nine-Dash Line, a vaguely defined boundary encompassing nearly 90% of the South China Sea. However, in 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague ruled that China’s claims had no legal basis under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It also affirmed that features like Johnson South Reef cannot generate territorial waters or exclusive economic zones. China rejected the ruling outright and intensified its military presence. This defiance reflects not only a disregard for international norms but a deliberate strategy to convert contested zones into fait accompli occupations, changing facts on the water while the legal order remains paralysed.
Vietnam continues to regard the seizure of Johnson South Reef as a violation of its sovereignty. Despite ideological similarities between the two governments, the event deeply damaged bilateral trust. Hanoi has since invested in asymmetric maritime capabilities, acquiring Kilo-class submarines and coastal missile systems and enhancing its coast guard. Vietnam has also strengthened ties with regional and extra-regional powers. Recent naval exchanges and defence dialogues with India, Japan, and the United States reflect a calibrated hedging strategy. Vietnam’s engagement in multilateral forums such as ASEAN remains a key platform for resisting unilateralism and advocating for rule-based order in maritime affairs.
China’s occupation of reefs like Johnson South Reef has converted the Spratlys into a network of military bastions. Satellite data shows runways over 3,000 meters, long-range surface-to-air missile systems (HQ-9), and radar installations designed for surveillance and denial operations. These platforms enhance Beijing’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) posture, threatening the safety of commercial and military navigation routes. The South China Sea hosts over one-third of global maritime trade, valued at more than $3.5 trillion annually. China’s attempt to control these waters through coercive presence directly threatens not only claimant states but all nations reliant on freedom of navigation.
Maritime flashpoints in the South China Sea have intensified, with China escalating coercive tactics against multiple regional states. In recent months, Philippine resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal have been repeatedly blocked by Chinese coast guard and maritime militia, employing water cannons, ramming manoeuvres, and military-grade lasers, resulting in injuries and damage to civilian vessels. Vietnam, too, continues to face pressure near Vanguard Bank, with Chinese survey ships obstructing oil exploration activities in Hanoi’s exclusive economic zone. These actions, coupled with Beijing’s layered “Cabbage Strategy” involving coast guard, navy, and maritime militia, are not isolated incidents but calculated moves to impose de facto control, destabilising regional order and pushing Southeast Asia closer to open confrontation.
The seizure of Johnson South Reef is not an isolated historical event but a precursor to a broader strategy of coercive expansion. It reflects China’s intent to displace regional power dynamics, marginalise international legal mechanisms, and establish strategic depth far beyond its coastline. This behaviour has prompted increased coordination among regional powers. The United States continues Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the area. Japan’s defence white papers emphasise the importance of a stable South China Sea. India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and naval engagement with Southeast Asian countries represent a proactive step toward ensuring open seas.
The blood spilt at Johnson South Reef foreshadowed a strategy that now threatens the entire maritime equilibrium of Southeast Asia. China’s use of historical narratives and selective legal interpretations to assert control sets a dangerous precedent. The reef today is not just a military outpost; and it is a symbol of violent territorial assertion. A robust regional and global response, anchored in law, deterrence, and strategic cooperation is essential. Failing to counter this model of expansionism risks emboldening similar tactics elsewhere, endangering peace not just in the South China Sea but across the broader Indo-Pacific.
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(Ashu Maan is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. He is currently pursuing his PhD from Amity University, Noida, in Defence and Strategic Studies.)