An analysis of China’s evolving nuclear strategy, PLARF’s expanding arsenal, and its strategic implications for India by Lieutenant Colonel Srikumar Bharathi P.
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An analysis of China’s evolving nuclear strategy, PLARF’s expanding arsenal, and its strategic implications for India by Lieutenant Colonel Srikumar Bharathi P.
By Lieutenant Colonel Srikumar Bharathi P: Historically, Beijing always maintained a muted stance on nuclear vectors, even though its first nuclear test was conducted way back in 1964. Mao himself was assertive about nuclear weapons, calling it “paper tiger”, though immediately on the establishment of People’s Republic of China (PRC), the country started its nuclear weapons and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program. During a discussion with EF Hill an Australian communist leader and founder of Communist Party of Australia in 1968, Mao stated, “Our country, in a sense is still a non- nuclear power, with this little nuclear weaponry, we cannot be counted as a nuclear country. If we are to fight a war, we must use conventional weapons”. Though China’s official stance remains as ‘No First Use’, the present thought process among Chinese strategists have evolved and internal debates are raging in China about the maintenance of unconditional No First Use policy.
Today, Chinese strategists as per the renewed thinking, seek to maintain a portion of Chinese strategic assets in Launch on Warning posture (LOW). Under a LOW posture, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) would launch nuclear weapons in retaliation for an incoming strike that has been detected by intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems but not yet detonated on Chinese territory. It is important to notice the 2023 US department of Defence’s Annual Report to Congress where a caution is alarmed on China’s NFU. “The PRC’s current approach to nuclear force includes a declaratory ‘No First Use’ (NFU) policy, stating it will never use nuclear weapons first at any time under any circumstances. This includes unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state or in nuclear-weapon-free zones. Despite this policy, China’s nuclear strategy probably includes consideration of a nuclear strike in response to a non- nuclear attack threatening the viability of China’s nuclear forces or C2, or that approximates the strategic effects of a nuclear strike. Beijing probably would also consider nuclear use to restore deterrence if a conventional military defeat in Taiwan gravely threatened CCP regime survival”.
The PLARF is an important pillar of PRC’s nuclear deterrence plan, which ensures Chinese Autonomy and deters any third-party intervention in a regional conflict. PRC’s 2019 defence White Paper declares that the PLARF is working towards “enhancing its credible and reliable capabilities of nuclear deterrence and counter attack, strengthening intermediate and long-range precision strike force, and enhancing strategic counter balance capability, so as to build a strong and modernised force”.
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The PLARF has grown in strength even as PLA downsized as part of military reforms of 2015. China’s missile classification is based on the Dong Feng/DF and Hong Niao/HN series. Dong Feng, meaning East Wind which are the Ballistic Missile Series, while the cruise missiles are of Hong Niao (Red Bird) or Chang Jian/CJ (Long Sword) series. An informed estimate of China’s ballistic missiles stands at 2200 including ninety ICBMs and it also holds approximately 320 nuclear warheads as of 2021, where the PLARF holds more than half of it, rest are stockpiled or earmarked for submarine-based vectors. Even though the Chinese nuclear warhead count seems relatively low, its arsenal is being upgraded continuously. China intends to hold 700 deliverable nuclear warheads by 2027 and 1,000 warheads by 2030, indicating that China is moving beyond its Minimum Deterrent levels. It seems, PRC is progressing as planned, as per latest inputs from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, which estimates, 346 nuclear warheads for land-based systems, the sea and air systems hold 72 and 20 respectively, 62 produced or under production warheads, total amounting to 500. On the account of latest missile count, an independent study estimates that China holds at least 1950 missiles, including 300 ICBMs, hypersonic glide vehicles and anti-ship ballistic missiles.
Over the last seven decades PLARF has been grown in strength with primary focus on Taiwan and South China Sea, with capabilities to contest India, Japan and the US. The long-term state goal as declared by President Xi during the address to 19th National Congress intends at achieving its cherished Middle Kingdom stature in contemporary times. Under that umbrella China intends to settle its boundary claims, however absurd it may be, in its own terms by all possible means and the PLARF plays a major role in the gambit by providing strategic deterrence. The PLARF posturing varies with the country against which it is manifesting. In the Taiwan scenario, PLARF nuclear capable vectors act as deterrence to any western influence, primarily the US. On the Russia Front, the historical rivalry between the communist states of past, doesn't exist anymore.
On India-China relationship, the boundary disputes and the growing stature of India in geopolitical spectrum, have resulted in China perceiving India as a regional contestant. Under this scope, a deliberate analysis of PLARF posturing, strategy and vector capabilities is a prudent way-forward for Indian strategists. Such an analysis would assist in identifying the silos which need immediate attention. The strategic forces of China may manifest in Indian context on a Misinterpreted LOW or an opponent operational victory marker or de-stabilisation in Tibet/ Xinjiang. Any erroneous interpretation of ISR reports on LOW posture, may result in activation of Chinese strategic forces which is a likely scenario and Indian planners need to plan for such contingencies. As for the conventional conflict, an operational victory marker may be perceived as a threat to the CCP regime which may result in manifestation of PLARF. Also, any destabilization activity in TAR/XAR during an ensuing conventional conflict is a viable trigger for employment of PLARF.
Even though the strategic equipment engagement strategy, is not oriented and aligned to the base location and operational orientation, these factors do give out certain predictable posturing and manifestation outcomes. Any Chinese Base that houses Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and ICBMs can cover the entire Indian subcontinent. However, Base 64 located at Lanzhou, Gansu province and its units have a high probability of manifesting in Indian context. Further analysis of the equipment profile of PLARF on the basis range and quantum, indicates towards DF 26 held with the 64 series Brigades are the most likely vectors that may have been earmarked by the PLARF for the Indian contingency.
With this as a marker, the Indian strategic planners may envision capability building and strategy review. Capability building needs focus under two silos, defence and diplomacy. The defense silo needs early operationalisation of Ballistic Missile Early Warning and Anti- Ballistic Missiles systems. Also, to guard against precision strikes by cruise missiles and aerial vectors investment into Missile Silo systems along with mobile systems seems mandatory.
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Lastly, full-fledged operationalisation of Nuclear Triad and strengthening its capabilities continuously. The diplomatic silo must address and explore new fronts to strengthen the WMCC (Working Mechanism on Consultation and Coordination on India China Border Affairs) and use it to de-escalate a conflict from growing, with a long term goal of resolving the border issue with China amicably as per established systems and procedures. Any such resolution of long pending issue in Indian context will make the path much easier to reach our goal of Viksit Bharat by 2047, the centenary year of our independence.
(Lieutenant Colonel Srikumar Bharathi P is a serving officer in the Indian Army and has authored a book on China, titled Know the Dragon - Ready Reckoner on China. He has keen academic interest in History, Strategy, Polity and Geo-Politics.)
Disclaimer: The views expressed, suggestions made & quoting of prominent personalities in the article are solely the responsibility of the author and do not have any official endorsement.
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