In Part-I of this special series on the state of terrorism in Afghanistan, Professor (Dr) Nishakant Ojha, an eminent expert in counter Terrorism (West Asia and the Middle East), drew a comparison between the old and the new Taliban and detailed how Afghanistan continues to be home to the enemies of most countries in the region. In this part, he explores the top three pro-Taliban terrorist groups present in Afghanistan. Read on
Special Series Part-I: The dilemma for Taliban in terror haven
Al Qaeda: The most notorious of the terrorist groups present in Afghanistan, particularly due to the September 11 attacks on the twin towers in New York. This group is enjoying a safe haven and a renaissance under the Taliban’s rule. Its senior leadership is living openly in safe houses across major cities of Afghanistan, and they are actively promoting their own victory against the US in Afghanistan. Their leaders are making a point out of living in key cities such as Kabul, to demonstrate that they roam around in the cities in which the US Army was present just two years ago. The objectives of Al Qaeda remain the same, to target Western countries and the monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council region.
The key figures of Al Qaeda enjoy close relationships with certain factions and individuals within the Taliban. Some of these ties have become familial as intermarriages have occurred between members/leaders of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and now a second generation has come of age, mostly with Arab fathers and Afghan mothers. This second generation of Al Qaeda is more difficult to verify as they often appear culturally and linguistically assimilated into the Afghan society and many of them have acquired Afghan IDs and Passports from the Interim Taliban Administration.
There are reports that many of the training centres of the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior have been availed to Al Qaeda where they continue to train the next generation of Jihadists. Many Al Qaeda fighters of the famed 055 Brigade of the 1990s are now embedded in the Badri 313 brigade of the Haqqani Network which played a key role in the capture of Kabul from the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Another part of the 055 brigade became the Lashkar-al-Zil which is still active within both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. The third part of the 055 brigade’s second generation has joined IS-K.
The new Iran-based leader of Al Qaeda named Saif al Adel is believed to be even more extreme than Al Zawahiri. The strike that killed Ayman al Zawahiri in downtown Kabul and a follow-up strike on Al Qaeda fighters in the Dehmazang area of Kabul were sufficient to prove that Al Qaeda enjoys sanctuaries in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. According to reports coming out of Afghanistan, in 2022, thousands of new foot soldiers joined Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, most of them hailing from Bangladesh and the Rohingya population of Myanmar.
After the US intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, most Talibs fled to Pakistan but many members of Al Qaeda fled to Iran as they felt unsafe in Pakistan. The current leader of Al Qaeda, Saif Al Adel still resides in Iran. It was this presence of Al Qaeda in Iran that allowed it to establish trust between Iran and the Taliban in the early 2010s when the Taliban was seeking alternative sponsors to reduce their dependence on Pakistan. Now, Al Qaeda plays a key role as a guarantor between ITA and Iran, specifically between Kandahar and Qom. They are facilitators of the narcotics trade between the inner circle of the Supreme Leader and the IRGC of Iran. They are also facilitating the smuggling of excess weapons from Afghanistan to Iran, which usually ends up with non-state actors and militants in the Middle East that are linked with Iran. The frequent gunfights that erupt at the Nimroz border post between Afghanistan and Iran are erroneously termed as water wars between Iran and Afghanistan.
These gunfights are not a result of policy changes, but instead, they erupt when deals related to the smuggling of drugs or weapons “go wrong”, as this is the border point from which the drugs and weapons are smuggled between the ITA and IRGC.
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): The TTP mostly hails from the Mehsud and Wazir tribes of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (now incorporated into the KP province) of Pakistan. Malakand Division is another area where TTP has deep roots. Many of the followers of the late Mawlana Sofi Mohammad, father-in-law of Mullah Fazlullah, also form a major part of TTP. Their objectives range from the installation of a Sharia-based Islamic System in the tribal areas and the autonomy of the tribal areas to the establishment of an Islamic Emirate within Pakistan that would be similar to the recently re-established Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. They have already announced two autonomous governance zones in the KP province of Pakistan.
The Northern Province includes Peshawar, Mardan, Malakand, and Gilgit-Baltistan while the southern province includes Bannu, Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan. Since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, TTP has significantly increased its attacks in Pakistan. At the request of Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban had facilitated failed peace talks between the TTP and Pakistan in Kabul, but the Taliban are unwilling to evict or hand over the TTP at the request of Pakistan. Even the most pro-Pakistani factions within the Taliban such as the Haqqani Network consider Pakistan a friend, but the TTP as fellow Islamist and tribal brothers, and their argument is that no one sacrifices a brother at the request of a friend.
TTP’s immediate objective is to prevent the 2023/2024 Pakistani elections, just as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Afghanistan (TTA) had attempted to disrupt the 2019 elections in Afghanistan. TTP allegedly holds a strength of up to 10,000 fighters many of whom helped the Afghan Taliban in their takeover of Afghanistan. The leadership of TTP has pledged allegiance to the Supreme Leader of the Afghan Taliban and has reiterated that there is no difference between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. Inside Afghanistan, TTP is being hosted in the Chahar Chineh sanctuary in Uruzgan province. Reportedly, TTP has access to a significant source of funds which is allowing them to buy influence within the cash-strapped Afghan Taliban.
Despite the presence of anti-Taliban terrorist groups inside Afghanistan, TTP seems to be able to reach out to those groups as well and can establish a tense line of communication between the Afghan Taliban and hostile terrorist groups operating under the umbrella of the Islamic State of Khorasan. The General Directorate of Intelligence of the Interim Taliban Authority believes that the TTP is receiving funds from neighbouring countries but is unwilling to raise questions over this issue as they appreciate this critical inflow of funds.
Tehreek-e-Taliban Balochistan (BLA): There are reports that due to the increasing tensions with Pakistan, the Interim Taliban Authority (ITA) is once again hosting members of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) in Uruzgan province. Initially after their takeover of Afghanistan, the Taliban arrested and evicted some members of BLA as a gesture of goodwill to Pakistan since they were not able to oblige with the request to arrest or evict members of TTP.
However, since early 2022, many BLA members switched their brands and established a new chapter of the Taliban called Tehreek-e-Taliban Balochistan (TTB). This allowed them to pledge allegiance to the Supreme Leader of the Taliban and acquire the right to sanctuary in Taliban-led Afghanistan. The TTB chapter of the Taliban has been the primary culprit behind the attacks on projects related to CPEC in the Baluchistan province of Pakistan.
End of Part II. Watch this space for Part III