A Year Since Galwan: 'We face an obdurate China that is unwilling to negotiate or yield any ground'

By Anish Kumar  |  First Published Jun 3, 2021, 7:47 PM IST

How much has the situation in Eastern Ladakh changed over the last 12 months? Why has China remained belligerent? Why has total disengagement not been achieved despite 11 rounds of dialogue? To understand more, Asianet Newsable's Anish Kumar reached out to China expert Jayadeva Ranade.


On June 15, India will observe the first anniversary of the Galwan Valley clash in which 20 Indian Army personnel lost their lives during a face-off against Chinese PLA soldiers. A year on, an uneasy calm prevails in Eastern Ladakh. There have been multiple levels of dialogue to secure disengagement and ensure de-escalation. 

How much has the situation in Eastern Ladakh changed over the last 12 months? Why has China remained belligerent? Why has total disengagement not been achieved despite 11 rounds of dialogue? To understand more, Asianet Newsable's Anish Kumar reached out to Jayadeva Ranade,  former additional secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat and presently president of the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy.

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Here is the first of a two-part interview

It has nearly been a year since the Galwan Valley clash. After rounds of deliberations and de-escalation, how much disengagement have we seen in Eastern Ladakh? What is the present position there?

There has been very little forward movement as far as the disengagement is concerned, except in the Pangong Tso areas, a very few baby steps that took place. There has been nothing more. In fact, the mobilisation remains very strong, and reports that we see in the Chinese military media indicate a strengthening in the firepower and the presence of the Chinese PLA in Ladakh. 

All along, India has reiterated that it has had the upper hand in the negotiations. Yet, the Chinese side remains belligerent. Why is that so?

As far as India is concerned, it has consistently sought to engage the Chinese in a peaceful negotiation to sort out the issues. The Chinese, on the other hand, often have, or I would say have a tendency to use muscle as the first resort. What we have seen here is the sudden appearance or decision by the Chinese troops to amass along the border. And had it not been for the rapid counter move by our forces and build up in this sector, I think things could have gotten more out of hand. 

The second thing is that the Chinese have laid claim to Ladakh. They are insisting that Ladakh is part of their sovereign territory. So that position is unlikely to change. 

The third is that they are also claiming other territories like Arunachal Pradesh, etc., and with (President) Xi Jinping in power, he has said that he will try and reclaim these territories. He has given a certain benchmark -- an obdurate China that is unwilling to negotiate or yield any ground. I personally expect that this standoff might continue. One indication is the Chinese media which is extremely critical, and the second is the absence of any talks on the borders between the army commanders.

India has been ramping up infrastructure along the borders. Yet, there have been reports of Chinese developing settlements along the border. What seems to be the strategy there?

Chinese, in fact, since 2017, started this programme what they called as Xiaokang border defence villages or model well-off modern villages. There are 628 villages they have proposed to construct along the border. They call them their watchdog -- eyes and ears watch post. What they are doing is they are repopulating these areas. Therefore the border areas, where there used to be one family comprising two or three people, are now expanding them to 20-30 families. They are also breaking the social cohesion in these places in Tibet by bringing in the population from other places. And the third is they are also doing it under the poverty alleviation programme; they have been given better housing, metal roads, electricity etc. These villages will be their eyes and ears or, as they say, their frontier guard posts. 

In the process, where there is a possibility that where the border is not undefined, they may try and set up border villages. There are reports one has come up just on the borders between Arunachal and Tibet and the second is in a place bordering Bhutan and Tibet. These have come up in the contested areas, and other is being built in the Tibet Autonomous Region.

Watch Part 1 of this interview

What should be India's strategy? 

In India, we will have to work out systems by which we can develop the border villages and create employment opportunities at least nearby, if not in those villages. This also means that we have to improve communication, transport, electricity, WiFi, etc. So there will have to be a comprehensive long-term effort, but it will be capital intensive. That's because you have to motivate the people, particularly the younger ones, to stay there and have better life and opportunities. There are ways in which it can be done.

There is growing Chinese activity around Indian waters, and, in fact, China has gained control of the Colombo port due to Sri Lanka's inability to pay its debt. How does this pose a danger to India, and what should New Delhi do about it?

Sri Lanka is our neighbour, and it's very close to us. A large part of Sri Lanka shares the same ethnic population as ours, but the apprehension is that with China now having got the rights of Colombo city port development project -- basically, a large chunk of territory has basically been handed over to them to manage -- China will utilise those facilities for its PLA Navy to either dock there or visit there. It could also engage in some other activities. I remember, many years ago, when Musharraf was still in power in Pakistan, he had posted an ISI officer who was focused on India operation there as ambassador to Sri Lanka. That gentleman started creating cells there, which were inimical towards us.

The Chinese also have a very close relationship with the Pakistanis. They have intelligence cooperation and sharing with the Pakistanis. So, that is also an additional point of concerns. The second concern is Chinese navy ships coming there. I would not be surprised that China tries to set up electronic eavesdropping posts there. These are the factors that are of concern to us. I am sure that we are taking steps to counter them.

What is China's endgame? 

China's aim is very simple. It is to rival -- if not surpass -- the United States. That is their endgame. They have very unusually set the deadline for it also. They have said that by 2049, which is the 100th year of the founding of the People's Republic of China, they would like to be a power with pioneering global influence. In other words, either to rival or surpass the US -- that is their stated objective. In the process, they will obviously be encroaching on the strategic and territorial spaces of a number of countries along the way. The first step before they aspire to challenging or surpassing the United States is to establish their dominance in the Asian region, and that is the process that we see today. I don't see any easing up in the Chinese efforts.

Click HERE to read for Part 2 of the interview

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