No Plan B: Inside Ruben Amorim’s Tactical Flaws Crippling Manchester United

Ruben Amorim’s rigid philosophy has left Manchester United predictable and fragile, with the worst start since WWII. Outnumbered in midfield, wasteful in attack, and weak at wing-back, rivals now find it all too easy to beat his side.

The Stubborn Philosopher

When Ruben Amorim arrived at Manchester United, he promised philosophy, not pragmatism. He declared he would not bend, would not adapt, and that if his style didn’t fit, the club would simply have to “change the man.”

That boldness once felt refreshing. Now it feels like United’s greatest liability. Thirty-one points from 31 league games, the worst start by any United boss since the war, and a humbling 3-0 defeat at the Etihad tell their own story. The Portuguese manager’s refusal to adjust has left his side predictable, fragile, and frustratingly easy to dismantle.

When Opponents Can Script the Game

Every Premier League coach knows exactly what’s coming: three centre-backs, two wing-backs, a pair of central midfielders left hopelessly outnumbered, two playmakers floating behind a lone striker. There is no plan B.

Paul Scholes voiced what many fans feel: “They know exactly the way Manchester United are going to play every single week.”

Marco Silva echoed it after Fulham’s 1-1 draw: “We know how they defend… we tried to overload with our three plus Alex Iwobi. It was as simple as that.”

United have become football’s open book—easy to study, easier still to exploit.

Midfield Lost at Sea

The most glaring flaw sits in the centre of the pitch. In a league dominated by 4-3-3 or 4-2-3-1 shapes, two midfielders are rarely enough. Unless, of course, you’ve got a N’Golo Kanté in his prime doing the work of two men, as Antonio Conte enjoyed at Chelsea. Amorim doesn’t.

Instead, he leans on Bruno Fernandes to partner either Manuel Ugarte—reckless and clumsy in possession—or Casemiro, whose legs no longer keep pace. Fernandes works harder defensively than his critics give him credit for, yet his positional awareness often falters. He left Phil Foden free to nod in Manchester City’s opener at the Etihad, and let Emile Smith Rowe drift untracked for Fulham’s equaliser at Craven Cottage.

When Jeremy Doku shifted centrally on Sunday, Guardiola exposed those gaps ruthlessly. United’s average positions showed Fernandes (No 8) and Ugarte (No 25) standing almost on top of each other, leaving oceans of space either side. Without Mason Mount—the only player who has previously thrived in such a system under Tuchel—United’s midfield remains a soft underbelly.

The “Jumping” Confusion

Even United’s pressing game looks muddled. Fernandes admitted as much after City: players can’t agree when to “jump” forward. Some step out too rashly, others hang back, and gaps appear everywhere.

Leny Yoro pushes up aggressively on one side of defence, Luke Shaw doesn’t on the other, and opponents breeze through the spaces they leave. It’s not just about effort—it’s a team caught between instructions and instinct, never in sync.

Goals? What Goals?

Ironically, United aren’t shy of shooting. They’ve had more attempts and more touches in opposition boxes than most Premier League sides this season. Their expected goals (xG) tally even ranks just behind City and Chelsea.

But strip away the penalties and an own goal, and Amorim’s United have just one open-play strike. Their conversion rate is a pitiful 5.7 per cent—only Aston Villa (yet to score) and Leeds fare worse.

Mbeumo, Cunha and Sesko cost over £200m between them, but United still look blunt. Their “fast breaks” are plentiful—no team has countered more—but too often they end with rushed efforts from poor angles rather than gilt-edged chances.

DorguThe Wing-Back Dilemma

The biggest irony? Amorim’s formation depends on wing-backs, yet his don’t deliver.

Against City, Guardiola deliberately left Patrick Dorgu in acres of space, confident he would do little damage. And he didn’t. Twelve touches in City’s box brought nothing. Of his 62 touches overall, just four found their way into the penalty area. His crossing was wasteful, his dribbles ineffective.

The numbers are damning. Since Amorim took charge, his four primary wing-backs—Mazraoui, Dorgu, Shaw and Dalot—have scored no league goals between them. Only Dalot has registered assists, three in total. Compare that with Crystal Palace’s Daniel Munoz, who has four goals and five assists on his own in the same period.

Conte’s Chelsea thrived because Alonso and Moses contributed 14 goals and assists between them. Tuchel’s Champions League winners had Reece James, Alonso and Chilwell bombing on. Amorim’s men offer nothing.

A Shaky Pair of Hands

Replacing Andre Onana with Altay Bayindir hasn’t solved the goalkeeping issue either. Bayindir looked jittery with the ball at his feet against City, relying on predictable passes to Yoro which Doku quickly cut off. When forced to kick long, his accuracy evaporated—just 16 successful passes from 31 attempts.

Senne Lammens, signed this summer, could be fast-tracked if Bayindir continues to struggle.

Can Amorim Be Saved From Himself?

The irony is that a back-three can work in England—if the details are right. But Amorim seems determined to prove his philosophy unshakeable, even when the evidence screams otherwise.

Tweaks could make a difference without abandoning the system entirely: push Fernandes higher, trust Kobbie Mainoo to anchor midfield, demand early deliveries from wing-backs into 6ft 4in striker Benjamin Sesko.

Yet Amorim’s own words hang over it all. He will not change unless he decides to. Until then, United remain painfully easy to play against: predictable in shape, flawed in execution, and stuck with a manager too stubborn to adapt.