In Part III of this special series on the state of terrorism in Afghanistan, Professor (Dr) Nishakant Ojha, an eminent expert in counter Terrorism (West Asia and Middle East), listed outfits that operate with the Taliban's blessings in Afghanistan and those who pose a threat to it. In Part IV, he decodes the reasons behind the reluctance of the Taliban to sever ties with terrorist groups
Special Series Part-I: The dilemma for Taliban in terror haven
Special Series Part-II: The terror trio under Taliban's patronage
Special Series Part-III: Merchants of terror run amok
After the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, many regional countries commenced engagement with the ITA and promised investment, trade and diplomatic relations, in the hope that the Taliban would assist in fighting or evicting those terrorist groups inside Afghanistan that harm the interests of these regional countries. In the past year, many regional countries have been disappointed after realizing that the Taliban are unable or not interested in cutting ties with terrorist groups. Some examples are China’s frustration with the continued ETIM presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s inability to convince the Taliban to cease hosting TTP.
Let us look at the key reasons why the Taliban are unable to cut ties with these terrorist groups, despite the high cost that they incur on the Taliban:
a) Marital Relations: Over the years many senior members of the Taliban have developed marital relations with the leaders and commanders of foreign terrorist groups that are present in Afghanistan. There are hundreds of cases of marriages between the first generation Al Qaeda Arab fighters and local Afghan and Pakistan women. Today their children are the second generation of Al Qaeda while they are culturally and linguistically inseparable from the local people of Afghanistan. With the deep marital relations between the Taliban and foreign terrorist fighters that now extend to the second generation, it is almost impossible for the Taliban’s leadership to turn its back on these foreign terrorist groups.
b) Culture of Asylum: The culture of providing asylum is deeply ingrained in the Pashtunwali code of conduct that is followed by the Pashtun tribes of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. As part of the Pashtunwali code to which the Taliban (who hail mostly from Pashtun Mullahs) also adheres. They would rather face death than betray those who seek asylum among them.
c) Importance of Afterlife: Most of the senior Taliban leadership are of old age and not in good health. Leaders such as Prime Minister Hassan Akhund and the Supreme Leader are suffering from various cardiovascular diseases and are unlikely to have many years left in this world. In their belief handing over foreign terrorists (their fellow Muslim brothers in Jihad) is a big sin, and if committed they may lose their chance of going to paradise.
d) Religious Legitimacy: An important reason why the leadership of the Taliban cannot afford to hand over or evict transnational terrorist groups is that in the highly religious and fragmented Taliban whichever faction decides to betray a transnational terrorist group (which the Talib foot soldiers consider as their fellow Mujahids) in favour of a non-Muslim or a 'secular' country, that faction will rapidly lose a considerable amount of religious legitimacy. This could lead to the overthrow or weakening of that faction by rival factions.
e) Fear of a Coup: Related to the issue of religious legitimacy above, is the Supreme Leader’s fear of a coup from within the ITA. Historically, Pashtun kings and leaders have constantly been overthrown by fellow Pashtun rivals. Thus, historically Pashtun kings have relied on non-Afghan militias and soldiers to enforce the writ of the King/Leader, as non-Afghan militias are unlikely to challenge the Afghan leader for the leadership position. The Supreme Leader of the Taliban suffers from the same paranoia and thus perceives benefits in surrounding his authority with transnational terrorist groups.
f) Economic Reasons: As per reports coming out of the ITA itself, many of the transnational terrorist groups based in Afghanistan allegedly have access to large amounts of funds from unknown sources. Without questioning the source, the ITA, especially its leaders, appreciate the inflow of funds due to the severe economic and financial crisis in Afghanistan. Thus, they see the need to continue to host and look after the transnational terrorist groups in Afghanistan.
g) Use of Terrorist Groups as a Tool of Influence against Regional Countries: The Interim Taliban Authority is well aware of its deficits of leverage when dealing with neighbouring countries, regional countries and the international community. The Taliban are aware that they lag behind in terms of professional armies, air force, drone technology, intelligence capabilities, nuclear weapons, GDP and funds available to the Government. However, the ITA believes that the presence of transnational terrorist groups that are sworn enemies of neighbouring and regional countries gives it an immense amount of leverage when dealing with those countries. They are unlikely to let go of this leverage, simply at the request of neighbouring or regional countries.
h) Fear of another Foreign Invasion: Many leaders, commanders and foot soldiers of the Taliban are concerned that they might face another foreign invasion in the near future. The hard-line policies of the senior Taliban leadership and the provision of asylum to foreign terrorist groups are among the reasons that have created a similar environment in Afghanistan to the one that existed before September 11, 2001. These Talibs who fear that another invasion may be imminent are either hosting or keeping a close relationship with foreign terrorists, as they might need their support again in the near future if the Taliban are militarily attacked from outside.
End of Part IV. Watch this space for the concluding part of the special series