Russia's hypersonic hype has been shot down... and so did 5 myths

Ukraine managed to down a Russian Kinzhal missile with the help of a US-supplied Patriot battery. This was in spite of the fact that President Vladimir Putin had earlier self-righteously proclaimed it to be a 'hypersonic' weapon, which would trump all existing air defence systems. 

Russian state news outlets sought to downplay the incident by denying it ever occurred. Yet, only 12 days later, the Ukrainian forces used a Patriot battery to shoot down six more Kinzhals that were fired at Kyiv. Both cases have been confirmed by the US government. Is this any indication that the 'hypersonic hype' has burst?

By launching the Kinzhal hypersonic missile against Ukraine, Russia raised false fears concerning Ukraine’s air defences and its superiority over the US in a hypersonic weapons race. Echoes of the Cold War missile gap myth were heard, which spurred the missile arms race further. 

However, Ukraine's successful interceptions have damaged Russia's reputation and the belief in the might of their advanced weapons system. Additionally, these interceptions have helped to debunk five myths about hypersonic weapons, which some have claimed are invaluable.

1) There Are Russian Hypersonics Now

Putin has asserted that Russian hypersonics have already been deployed in Ukraine and such weapons are recognized by their ability to reach Mach 5. This term is usually utilized to refer to two distinct types of missiles: Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) and Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCM). However, the Kinzhal is not an air-launched ballistic missile. And Ukraine's capability to repel the entire volley of six Kinzhals casts doubts over the very hypersonic nature of the system.

2) Impossible to Intercept Hypersonics

Intercepting HGVs and HCMs is more difficult than intercepting ballistic missiles with existing missile defences and the development of hypersonics is even more difficult as evidenced by the cancelling of the US Air Force's HGV Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon. While it may seem that interception of these weapons is impossible, existing missile defence systems are designed to intercept missiles that travel much faster than these types of weapons and can easily be adapted to counter hypersonics.

Additionally, a satellite constellation is planned to be launched by 2025 to assist tracking of these weapons. The US sea-based Aegis terminal defence system already has a nascent capability to intercept hypersonics as of 2022.

3) US Lags Behind in Hypersonic Defence

It may seem that the US is superior to Russia and China when it comes to hypersonic defence. However, if one gauges success in terms of offensive hypersonic systems reportedly deployed, the US lags behind. This would be similar to evaluating the Chinese military's use of AI through declarations made at the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

We are quite informed about the testing of HGVs from China and Russia as they are fired from easily detected ballistic missiles accessible to the public. China has conducted multiple tests and the media has over-emphasized its reactions. For instance, many were surprised when China tested a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) capable of flying around the world and carrying a nuclear warhead in July 2021, although it is an old technology developed by the Soviets in the 1960s. 

Russia has conducted four tests on their Avangard HGV, but it is uncertain whether this is enough. Additionally, the Zircon HCM appears to have a flawless test record, although it is limited in certain ways. The US has taken a more moderate path with its programmes and statements regarding them and is likely to avoid fielding systems not sufficiently tested.

4) Strategic Stability Turns Uncertain

The issue of whether the US is 'lagging behind' in the development of hypersonic capabilities is relevant is up for debate. China and Russia already have a strong intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system, putting a question mark on the extra value of a hypersonic system that can make it through these same defences. 

A Congressional Budget Office report determined that there were only limited circumstances in which hypersonics would be better than existing weapons systems and that they are more expensive and less survivable. It is hard to determine whether hypersonics will ultimately lead to a higher or lower incentive to strike first and the current plans and deployments do not suggest any change. 

It is possible that this could change later on, but the future of strategic stability is uncertain.

5) Insufficient Control for Hypersonics

It appears as though the three major powers -- China, Russia and the US -- are engaging in a hypersonic arms race. China’s high expenditure on this technology may be in response to the US’s progress, which could result in a security dilemma that would be best addressed with arms control. There are many unanswered questions about strategic stability, engineering and deployment issues and the cost of such programmes, thus making it reasonable to consider arms control as a viable option.

Rather than being confined by traditional concepts of arms control, imaginative solutions. need to be explored. Some uncomplicated measures that could be easily verified, for instance, a ban on testing hypersonic glide vehicles -- could help redeem this weapon's one-upmanship. Since China has an advantage in offensive hypersonics development, this could be an opportunity for them to lock it in. 

Russia is not likely to take part due to their dismantling of arms control treaties and their sanctions and conflict make it challenging for them to compete with the US in the field of hypersonics right now.

Confidence-building actions that handle deployments which endanger strategic stability --such as distinct separation of nuclear and non-nuclear forces -- would also appeal to everyone since they do not necessitate reductions but could still be a stabilizing force. Quantitative restrictions, potentially in the form of unequal arms control for hypersonics in which parties accept different cuts or limits for forces or substitute one weapon for a different kind, which have had success where symmetrical reductions failed, might also be more acceptable and could stop costs from accelerating too quickly. But none of these measures have a chance while we remain enthralled by the hypersonic hype.