EXCLUSIVE: Shiv Kunal Verma talks about his latest work ‘Yodha: Illustrated Military History of India’

In an interview with the military historian and author, Shiv Kunal Verma, Asianet Newsable talks about his recent book “Yodha: Illustrated Military History of India”. Through his book, Verma has tried to bring India’s rich military history alive with over 1,600 illustrations, paintings, and photographs. The book covers the period from The Epics (BCE) to The Uprising (1857). 

Q: By packing military history from Epics to 1857 War, what message you set out to give to the readers?

A: The first step when it comes to nation building is to understand who we are. Not so much our regional identities that are broken up by narrow domestic walls, but the larger picture that looks at the subcontinent as ‘Fortress India’. Whatever the dynamics that existed at the time, once we realize that events in Mizoram or Manipur are as  real and immediate as something happening in say Delhi or Mumbai, only then will we qualify to call ourselves a real country. 

The 1857 Uprising seemed to be the ideal place to end the first volume. The next book simply picks up the thread from there and moves forward. Let me also state that India’s history as a whole is so vast and complex, we can at best give an overview of what happened at a particular time.

Q: What is one big stand out military strategy from the time span of the book according to you?

A: We’ve had a plethora of good kings and generals in the subcontinent in the past. Unfortunately, in most cases their thinking was regional and defensive, while the external threats, be it the Islamic forces or colonial powers, were mobile and flexible. Just like water, if they came up against formidable opposition, they would probe elsewhere until they found a vulnerable spot. That is why, it’s vital for us to think of the subcontinent as a whole. In today’s context where International boundaries are reasonably well defined, one obviously cannot expect to redefine frontiers. So you simply have to ensure you have your doctrines in place and the ability to hit hard if you are provoked.

Q: Military strategy continues to evolve. At what stage do you think India began lagging behind?

A: Indians had held their own against European powers for almost 200 years. The Maratha Navy was a formidable power even if they lacked blue-water capability, Kanhoji Angre’s feats are legendary, for he had held the Portuguese and the British warships at bay. Marthanda Varma’s Travancore had reduced the Dutch into also rans after the Battle of Colachal in 1741. But once the Bengal Sultanate began to weaken, Robert Clive got the opening he wanted at Plassey. Once the sepoy armies were drilled into what the British called ‘rock like infantry’, India literally self-imploded and the East India Company had the Indians on the run. Any opposition was dealt with swiftly and without mercy.

Q. India was a naval power in ancient and medieval times. How did India miss the bus in becoming a naval power?

A: The Chola’s were jostling with the Chinese for the control of trade in the Indian Ocean, and their probes into Vietnam, Cambodia (Khmer) and Indonesia were part of a larger struggle to establish trade links. However, the Chola expeditions were maritime expeditions and not necessarily a Naval task force. Indian ships were going all over, but only to trade and not conquer.

The same was also true for the Arab dhows who could neither outrun or outfight European warships, which were also evolving all the time. From maps and charts that go back to the era of the Delhi Sultanate, we can deduce that there was an elaborate system in place to defend the coastal areas. After the Battle of Diu in 1509 where the Portuguese defeated a force that also included the Egyptian Mamluks, the Arabs were on the back foot.

The Marathas as a naval power were formidable while they lasted, but their own people succeeded in destroying them. Once they were out of the picture, then it was a tussle between the British and the French in a bid to assert their dominance.

Q: What lessons do you think that the Indian military strategists should keep in mind from the times covered in the book?

A: Stay united. Treat every hostile development as a major threat to National Security. India simply cannot afford to be viewed as a ‘soft state’ anymore. Also, don’t rely on others to bail you out in case things get nasty. One simply has to learn to walk alone, and in the process, ensure you carry a big stick!

Q: China leads India in naval power by a wide margin. Does the book give a message to Indian Navy?

A: Volume 1 of YODHA documents the underlying maritime trade war with the Chinese, and the setting even then was against the backdrop of the Malacca Straits. Today the Chinese Navy is in a tussle for world dominance with the United States, and though at present they lag behind, they have the Oriental single-minded zeal and objective to bridge the gap in the future. Either way, being the littoral state in the Indian Ocean, we have to realise that this is not a recent phenomenon, and it will only get more intense in the future. Fortunately New Delhi seems to have shed its previous ‘land-border’ mindset.

Q. Now that the world is full of military hot spots, do you think we are future ready?

A: We have to evolve with the time. A book like Yodha underlines the fact that nothing is permanent and things, especially war fare, keeps evolving with the times. India has to now assert itself even in matters that extend beyond our immediate region. With one fifth of the global population being ethnically Indian, we along with the Chinese have to be counted.

Q: If you have to pick one battle that changed the destiny of India, then what will be that and why? 

A: Perhaps the most important battles were the two fought back to back at Tarain near Delhi between Prithviraj Chauhan and Muhammad Ghori in 1191 and 1192. After Ghori had annexed Punjab in 1186, the North Indian Hindu princes had formed a confederacy to take him on. Having been defeated in the first battle, in an act of great magnanimity, the Rajput king had spared his life, only to be defeated the next year. This battle allowed Qutab-ud-din Aibak to lay the foundations of the Delhi Sultanate that lasted till 1526. The Mughals were simply another face of Islamic rule that then took over after Babur’s victory at Panipat.

Q: Which dynasty/ruler was the best in terms of military strategy and why?

A: It’s hard to tell, for information at best is scanty when it comes to the finer details of generalship. If you just look at the Cholas, Pallavas and Pandyas, they were constantly at war and many a ruler distinguished himself, but since the impact of these wars were regional, they are lost in obscurity when we talk of outstanding rulers/ generals. 

The young Aurangzeb, when he fought his brothers in order to succeed Shah Jahan, was tactically brilliant, especially when it came to using his artillery with telling effect. Ironically the two other names that come to mind fought Aurangzeb’s armies. Shivaji in the west and Lachit Borphukan in the east.

The Maurya and the Gupta periods had to have powerful well led armies because they managed to subjugate most of the subcontinent.

Even Tipu Sultan, who managed to antagonise the Kodavas (Coorg) and the kingdom of Travancore with his fanatical and rabid behaviour, fought the British with a lot of skill. He also invested heavily in rockets, but was eventually killed by the British at Seringapatam. Marthanda Varma, Ranjit Singh, Zorawar Singh, even the Vijayanagar and Gajapati kings can stake a claim in their own right.

Q: Do you think Agniveer scheme has any parallel in history? Do you any thoughts on this?

A: Recruitment has always been the key to raising loyal and steadfast armies. After the British takeover, all sorts of treaties and conditions were imposed to ensure no army could be raised to challenge them. 

Independent India inherited the British recruitment system and for decades, most of those policies remained unchanged but they were legacy issues. What later got the name ‘Agniveer’ was conceptualised as one of the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee where keeping the ‘army young’ was a stated objective. Obviously there are problems with the scheme and those issues need to be tweaked and sorted out by the Armed Forces and MOD. It’s important not to make it a political issue, but to take decisions that are in the long term interests of the country. Too much half-informed public discourse on the subject will not help anybody.